Political use of ‘diplomatic cable’ to haunt Pakistan’s Foreign Office for many years: report
The ‘diplomatic cable’ which has plunged Pakistan into a constitutional crisis, also attracted fair resentment from the Foreign Office (FO) against the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) for using the communique for gaining ‘political mileage’.
Kamran Yousaf in his report for The Express Tribune writes, “Two Foreign Office officials, spoke to The Express Tribune on condition of anonymity due to sensitivity of the issue, revealed that the diplomats were not happy with the controversy.”
One diplomatic on condition of anonymity told Yousaf that the repercussions of the way the government used “secret and classified communication” to achieve its “political objectives and its negative impact” would be felt in the FO for “many years” to come.
“Diplomats are eyes and ears of Pakistan who give frank and honest feedback from the countries where they serve,” the official added.
“Such honest and candid assessments are meant for policymakers to devise a strategy accordingly,” the official explained.
“But if governments start using such secret communications for their political gains, then the diplomats would be reluctant to write honest assessments,” the official cautioned.
“If the Foreign Office start making public diplomatic cables, people would be blown away,” the official said, insisting such candid discussions between diplomats are common.
Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan on April 3, named Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu as the United States (US) representative who had a meeting with Pakistan’s Ambassador in the US, which led to the “threatening diplomatic cable”.
PM Khan on March 27 claimed that the Opposition’s no-trust move is part of an alleged “foreign-funded conspiracy” hatched against his government. It is pertinent to mention here that the Opposition tabled the no-confidence motion against PM Khan on March 8. The government claims to have received the threatening communique on March 7.